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Abstract
Internet censorship measurements rely on lists of web-
sites to be tested, or “block lists” that are curated by third
parties. Unfortunately, many of these lists are not public,
and those that are tend to focus on a small group of topics,
leaving other types of sites and services untested. To in-
crease and diversify the set of sites on existing block lists,
we use natural language processing and search engines to
automatically discover a much wider range of websites
that are censored in China. Using these techniques, we
create a list of 1125 websites outside the Alexa Top 1,000
that cover Chinese politics, minority human rights organi-
zations, oppressed religions, and more. Importantly, none
of the sites we discover are present on the current largest
block list. The list that we develop not only vastly expands
the set of sites that current Internet measurement tools can
test, but it also deepens our understanding of the nature of
content that is censored in China. We have released both
this new block list and the code for generating it.
1 Introduction
Internet censorship is pervasive in China. Topics ranging
from political dissent and religious assembly to privacy-
enhancing technologies are known to be censored [6].
However, the Chinese government has not released a com-
plete list of websites that they have filtered. [11]. When
performing measurements of Internet filtering, then, the
inability to know what sites are blocked creates a circu-
lar problem of discovering the sites to measure in the
first place. To do so, various third parties currently cu-
rate lists of websites that are known to be censored, or
“block lists”. These lists are used to both understand what
content is censored in China and how that censorship is
implemented. Indeed, the Open Observatory of Network
Interference notes that “censorship findings are only as
interesting as the sites and services that you test.” [24].
Instead of curating a block list by hand, Darer et al.
proposed a system called FilteredWeb that automatically
discovers web pages that are censored in China [8]. Their
approach is summarized in the following steps. First, key-
words are extracted from web pages on the Citizen Lab
block list, a small, hand-curated list. These are English
words that are ranked through TF-IDF, a technique which
we describe in Section 3.2. Then, each keyword is used
as a query for a search engine, such as Bing. The intuition
is that censored web pages contain similar keywords. Fi-
nally, each web page that appears in the search results is
tested for DNS manipulation in China. These tests are per-
formed by sending DNS queries to IP addresses in China
that don’t belong to DNS servers. If a DNS response is re-
ceived, then, it is inferred that the request was intercepted
in China and that the website is censored [8,18,20]. Each
web page that is censored is fed back to the beginning
of the system. FilteredWeb discovered 1,355 censored
domains, 759 of which are outside the Alexa Top 1,000.
In this paper, we build upon the approach of Filtered-
Web in the following ways. First, we extract content-rich
phrases for search queries. In contrast, FilteredWeb only
uses single words for search queries. These phrases pro-
vide greater context regarding the subject of censored
web pages, which enables us to find websites that are
very closely related to each other. For example, consider
the phrase中国侵犯人权 (Chinese human rights viola-
tion). When we perform the searches Chinese, human,
rights , and violation independently, we mainly
get websites for Western media outlets, many of which
are known to be censored in China. By contrast, if we
search for Chinese human rights violation
as a single phrase, then we discover a significant number
of websites related to Chinese culture, such as homepages
for activist groups in China and Taiwan. Identifying and
extracting such key phrases is a non-trivial task, as we
discuss later.
Second, we use natural language processing to parse
Chinese text when adding to the blocklist. In contrast,
FilteredWeb only extracts English words that appear on a
web page. As such, any website that is written in simpli-
fied Chinese is ignored, neglecting a significant portion
of censored sites. For example, there are many censored
websites and blogs that cover Chinese news and culture,
and many of them only contain Chinese text. As such,
to discover region-specific, censored websites, such a
system should be able to parse Chinese text. Because Chi-
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nese is typically written without spaces separating words,
this requires the use of natural-language processing tools.
Third, we make our block list public, in contrast to
previous work. The authors of FilteredWeb made their
block list available to us for validation; we have published
our block list so others can build on it [15].
In summary, we built and now maintain a large, public,
culture-specific list of websites that are censored in China.
These websites cover topics such as political dissent, his-
torical events pertaining to the Chinese Communist Party,
Tibetan rights, religious freedom, and more. Furthermore,
because many of these website are written from the per-
spective of Chinese nationals and expatriates, we are able
to get first-hand accounts of Chinese culture that are not
present in other block lists. This new resource can help
researchers who are interested in studying Chinese cen-
sorship from the perspective of marginalized groups that
most affected by it.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We build upon the approach of FilteredWeb to dis-
cover censored websites in China that specifically
pertain to its culture. We do so by extracting poten-
tially sensitive Chinese phrases from censored web
pages and using them as search terms to find related
websites.
• We build a list of 1125 censored domains in China,
which is 12.5× larger than the standard list for cen-
sorship measurements [6]. Furthermore, none of
these websites are on the largest block list avail-
able [8].
• We perform a qualitative analysis of our block list to
showcase its advantages over previous work.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we
describe our approach to building a large, culture-specific
block list for China. This includes an in-depth analysis
of the advantages of our approach over previous work.
Then, we describe three large-scale evaluations that we
performed. Each of these evaluations produced qualita-
tively different results due to different configurations of
our system. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of
how the block list we built could be used by researchers.
We also briefly explore directions for future work.
2 Related work
Existing block lists have several limitations. First, some
of these block lists have been curated by organizations
that study Internet censorship, but these lists are now
outdated [5, 23]. Other lists have been automatically gen-
erated by systems similar to ours, but they are not publicly
available at the time of publication [8,9,32]. Furthermore,
these systems do not focus on blocked websites that are
particular to Chinese culture. There are also systems that
Figure 1: Our approach for discovering censored websites.
create block lists through crowd-sourcing, but are unable
to automatically detect newly censored websites [13, 14].
Finally, the Citizen Lab block list focuses on popular
websites–such as social media, Western media outlets,
and VPN providers–but not websites pertaining to Chi-
nese culture [6].
Other systems use block lists to determine how cen-
sorship works, but they do not create more block lists.
For example, Pearce et al. proposed a system that uses
block lists to measure how DNS manipulation works on
a global scale by combining DNS queries with AS data,
HTTPS certificates, and more [26]. Pearce et al. also
built Augur, a system that utilizes TCP/IP side channels
between a host and a potentially censored website to de-
termine whether or not they can communicate with each
other [25]. Furthermore, Burnett et al. proposed Encore,
a system that utilizes cross-origin requests to potentially
censored websites to passively measure how censorship
works from many vantage points [3]. Lastly, several plat-
forms have been proposed that crowd-source censorship
measurements from users by having them install custom
software on their devices [16, 22, 30].
3 Approach
Figure 1 summarizes our approach to finding censored
websites. For the most part, our approach is similar to
that of FilteredWeb [8]. We start by bootstrapping a list
of web pages that are known to be censored, such as the
Citizen Lab block list [6]. Then, we extract Chinese and
English phrases that characterize these web pages. Then,
we use these phrases as search queries to find related web
pages that might also be censored. Finally, we test each
search result for DNS manipulation in China and feed the
censored web pages back to the beginning of the system.
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The rest of this section details the new capabilities of our
approach beyond the state of the art.
3.1 Extracting multi-word phrases
An n-gram is a building block for natural-language
processing that represents a sequence of “n” units of
text, e.g. words. For example, if we were to com-
pute all of the bigrams of words in the English phrase
Chinese human rights violation, we’d get
Chinese human, human rights, and rights
violation. Similarly, if we were to compute all
the trigrams of words, we’d get Chinese human
rights and human rights violation. On the
other hand, if we simply extract unigrams from the sen-
tence, we’d be left with Chinese, human, rights,
and violation. As such, we believe that by extracting
content-rich unigrams, bigrams, trigrams, we’re able to
learn more about the subject of a web page.
Unfortunately, computing the n-grams of words in Chi-
nese text is difficult because it is typically written without
spaces, and there is no clear indication of where charac-
ters should be separated. Computing such boundaries in
natural-language processing tasks is often probabilistic,
and depending on where characters are separated, one can
arrive at very different meanings for a given phrase [33].
For example, consider the text特首. This is considered
a Chinese unigram that translates to “chief executive” in
English, but the character 特 on its own translates to
“special”, and the character 首 on its own translates to
“first” [12]. Given that we do not have domain-specific
knowledge of the web pages that we’re analyzing, we
consider a unigram to be whatever the segmenter soft-
ware in the Stanford CoreNLP library considers to be a
unigram, even if the output consists of multiple English
words. [4, 36].
We believe that using Chinese unigrams, bigrams, and
trigrams for search queries instead of individual English
words is more effective for discovering censored web-
sites in China. For example, we know that websites
that express collective dissent are considered sensitive
by the Chinese government [17]. If we used the words
destroy, the, Communist, or Party individually
as search terms, we might not get websites that express
collective dissent because the words have been taken out
of context. On the other hand, the phrase “destroy
the Communist Party” as a whole expresses col-
lective dissent, which might enable us to find many cen-
sored domains when used as a search term. We evaluate
the effectiveness of such phrases in Section 5.3.
3.2 Ranking phrases
To “rank” the phrases on a censored web page, we use
term-frequency/inverse document-frequency (TF-IDF).
TF-IDF is a natural language technique that allows us
to determine which phrases best characterize a given
web page [29]. It can be thought to work in three steps.
First, we compute the term-frequency for each phrase on
a web page, which means that we count the frequency
of each unigram, bigram and trigram. Then, we com-
pute the document-frequency for each phrase on a web
page, which entails searching a Chinese corpus for the
frequency of a given phrase across all documents in the
corpus [27]. Finally, we multiply the term frequency by
the inverse of the document frequency. The resulting
score gives us an idea of how important a given Chinese
phrase is to a web page.
Using this method, phrases like 1989年民主运
动 [1989 democracy movement] and 天安门广
场示威 [Tienanmen Square Demonstrations]
might rank highly on a website about Chinese political
protests. We would then use these phrases as search terms
in order to find related websites that might also be cen-
sored. If we find a lot of censored URLs as a result,
then we can infer that the topic covered by that phrase is
considered sensitive in China.
3.3 Parsing Chinese text
Before we can compute TF-IDF for a given web page, we
need to tokenize the text. Doing so is simple enough for
English because each word is separated by a space. For
languages such as Chinese, however, all of the words in a
sentence are concatenated, without any spaces between
them. As such, we need to apply natural-language pro-
cessing techniques to perform fine-grained analysis of the
text on a web page.
To do so, we make use of Stanford CoreNLP, a set
of natural language processing tools that operate on text
for English, Arabic, Chinese, French, German, and Span-
ish [7]. For Chinese web pages, it allows us split a sen-
tence into a sequence of unigrams, each of which may
represent one word or even multiple words. By combining
neighboring unigrams, then, we can extract key phrases
from a web page that describe its content.
As previously mentioned, although FilteredWeb is con-
cerned with finding web pages that are censored in China,
it is only able to parse text for the ISO basic Latin al-
phabet [8]. By being able to parse Chinese text as well
as ISO Latin text, then, we are able to cover many more
web pages and extract regional information that may ex-
plain why a given web page is censored. In future work,
we could make use of more intricate tools from Stan-
ford CoreNLP likes its part-of-speech tagger to identify
phrases that convey relevant information.
4 Evaluation
We performed a large-scale evaluation of our approach
to discover region-specific websites that are censored in
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Figure 2: Top censored domains by URL count.
China. We began by seeding with the Citizen Lab block
list, which is the most widely used list by censorship
researchers. The list contains 220 web pages that either
are blocked or have been alleged to be blocked in the past.
Since we only extract phrases from web pages that are
currently censored, we began by testing each web page on
the block list for censorship. This left us with 108 unique
web pages and 85 domains.
From November 11th, 2017 to July 9th, 2018, we used
Bing’s Search API to search for websites related to known
censored websites [21]. According to the API, each call
can return at most 50 search results. Since it would be
expensive to perform multiple API calls for each search
term, we limited ourselves to one API call, i.e. 50 search
results, per search term. For each website in the search
results, we tested for censorship by sending a DNS re-
quest to a set of controlled IP addresses in China that
don’t belong to DNS servers. As with FilteredWeb, if
we received a DNS response, we inferred that the DNS
request was intercepted, and thus the tested website is cen-
sored. Finally, we performed three separate evaluations
to measure the effectiveness of different phrase sizes for
finding censored websites. With each evaluation, we only
extracted unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams, respectively.
We also limited each evaluation to 1,000,000 URLs to be
consistent with the methodology of FilteredWeb [8].
We also configured the Bing API calls so that any URLs
from Blogspot, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Tumblr
would be ignored. We did this for a couple of reasons.
For one, these websites are widely known to be censored
in China, so we would not be providing new information
by having these websites or their subdomains in our result
set. Furthermore, Tumblr and Blogspot assign a unique
subdomain to each user’s blog, and in some cases we’d
get a dozen blogs from a single search query. In order
to find culture-specific websites that are normally buried
by the top 50 search results, then, we need to omit these
blogs.
5 Results
We reached several key insights from performing our
evaluations. First, we were able to discover hundreds of
censored websites that are not present on existing block
lists. Furthermore, we noticed that many websites on our
block list receive very little traffic. Lastly, we found that
by using politically-charged phrases as search terms, we
were able to find a disproportionately large amount of
censored websites. The rest of this section discusses the
main findings in depth.
5.1 Existing blocklists are incomplete
By using natural-language processing on Chinese web
pages, we were able to discover hundreds of censored
websites that are not present on the Citizen Lab block
list–the standard for censorship measurements–and Fil-
teredWeb’s block list [6,8]. Furthermore, only 3 of the top
50 censored domains that appeared in our search results
are in the top 50 censored domains found by Filtered-
Web. Figure 2 breaks down the URL count for the top
25 censored domains that we discovered. These websites
seem to mainly cover Chinese human rights issues, news,
censorship circumvention, and more.
4
Figure 3: Ranking of censored websites on Alexa Top 1 Million.
For instance, wiki.zhtube.com appears to be
a Chinese Wikipedia mirror. The web page for
zhtube.com seems to be the default page for a Chi-
nese LNMP (Linux, NginX MySQL, PhP) installation on
a virtual private server [19]. We found over 3000 URLs
in our dataset that point to this website, which may sug-
gest that Chinese websites are trying to circumvent the
on-and-off censorship of Wikipedia in China [35]. Fur-
thermore, blog.boxun.com is a United States-based
outlet for Chinese news that relies heavily on anonymous
submissions. The owners of the website note that “Boxun
often reports news that authorities do not tell the public,
such as outbreaks of diseases, human rights violations,
corruption scandals and disasters” [2]. Thus, by building
on the approach of FilteredWeb, we were able to produce
a qualitatively different block list. We recommend putting
these two block lists together to create a single block list
that is both wide in scope and large in size.
Intuitively, we were able to find hundreds of qualita-
tively different censored domains than those found by
FilteredWeb because we could extract Chinese-specific
topics from web pages. We were able to do so by using
TF-IDF with a Chinese corpus to rank the “uniqueness” of
Chinese phrases that appeared on a given web page. For
example, the trigram仅限于书面 (“only written”) was
poorly ranked on tiananmenmother.org–a Chinese
democratic activist group– because although it appears
frequently, it’s a common phrase in Chinese, according
to the Chinese corpus on PhraseFinder [27]. On the other
hand, the trigram自由亚洲电台 (“Radio Free Asia”) was
highly ranked because it didn’t appear frequently, and it’s
an uncommon phrase in Chinese. It should also be noted
that Radio Free Asia is a broadcasting corporation whose
stated mission is to “provide accurate and timely news
and information to Asian countries whose governments
prohibit access to a free press” [28]. Thus, by scoring Chi-
nese phrases with TF-IDF against a Chinese corpus, we
were able to determine which phrases are “content-rich”
on a given web page.
5.2 China blocks many unpopular websites
Figure 3 shows the ranking of the websites we discov-
ered on the Alexa Top 1,000,000. Notably, many of the
websites we discovered are spread throughout the tail of
the list, and some of the websites are not even on the list
at all. Given that the top 100,000 websites likely receive
the vast majority of traffic on the Internet, we can infer
that censors in China are not just interested in blocking
“big-name”, popular websites. They are actively seeking
out websites of any size that contain “sensitive” content.
We also discovered a number of websites that fall outside
the Alexa Top 1,000,000 altogether. Without the use of
an automated system that can discover censored websites,
it’s unlikely that the public would even be aware that these
websites are blocked.
Table 1 shows the breakdown of how many censored
websites we discovered. By using unigrams, we were
Phrase length All censored domains New censored domains
Unigrams 1029 719
Bigrams 970 598
Trigrams 975 579
Total 1756 1125
Table 1: Total number of censored domains discovered.
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Figure 4: Censored domains discovered over unique URLs
crawled.
able to discover 719 domains that are not on any publicly
available block list. By using bigrams, we were able to
discover 598 censored domains. Lastly, by using trigrams,
we were able to discover 579 censored domains. In total,
we discovered 1125 censored domains, none of which are
on the Alexa Top 1000 or Darer et al.’s blocklist [1, 8].
Each evaluation found 273 censored domains in common.
Furthermore, each of these evaluations were performed
with 1,000,000 unique URLs, consistent with the method-
ology of FilteredWeb [8]. Figure 4 shows how many
censored domains we discovered as a function of unique
URLs crawled for each evaluation.
5.3 Political phrases are highly effective
We also wanted to see if there is a correlation between
the presence of certain phrases and whether or not a given
website is censored, even if we have no ground truth. For
example, if we make a search for中国侵犯人权 (Chinese
human rights violation) and find that a particular search
result is censored, then we cannot be certain whether the
presence of that phrase caused the website to be blocked.
Even if we assume that a censor is manually combing
Chinese English Censored domains
王歧山 Wang Qishan 74%
李洪志 Li Hongzhi 64%
郭伯雄 Guo Boxiong 62%
胡锦涛 Hu Jintao 56%
胡平 Hu Ping 54%
Morty Morty 52%
命案 Homicide 52%
特首 Chief executive 52%
Vimeo Vimeo 50%
中情局 CIA 50%
Table 2: Sample of unigrams with significant blockrates
through search engines to find sensitive websites, the
website could have been blocked because it contained
totally different content.
Nevertheless, there seems to be some correlation for
certain phrases. Table 2 shows a sample of unigrams that
returned the most number of unique filtered domains from
Bing. For example, the top four unigrams–Wang Qishan,
Li Hongzhi, Guo Boxiong, and Hu Jintao–are the names
of controversial figures in Chinese history. Li Hongzhi is
the leader of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, whose
practitioners have been subject to persecution and censor-
ship by the Chinese government since 1999 [10]. Simi-
larly, Guo Boxiong is a former top official of the Chinese
military that was sentenced to life in prison in 2016 for ac-
cepting bribes, according to the Chinese government [34].
Thus, if a Chinese website discusses these people, the
website may become censored for containing “sensitive”
content.
There are also bigrams that correlate with a large per-
centage of censored domains, but they are more explicitly
political than the unigrams. Table 3 shows this result.
First, most of the bigrams refer to the Chinese Commu-
nist Party in some way. Phrases such as 中共的威胁
(Chinese Communists threaten), 江泽民胡锦涛 (Jiang
Zemin Hu Jintao), and 中国共产党的治安 (Public se-
curity of the CPC) do not necessarily convey sensitive
information, but they nonetheless refer to the government
of China. On the other hand, some phrases clearly refer
to political dissent, such as 官员呼吁 (Officials called
on),迫害活动 (Persecution activities),非法拘留 (Illegal
detention), and宣称反共 (Declared anti-communist).
We see a similar result with trigrams, as shown by Ta-
ble 4. Phrases that stand out include中国共产党的宗教
政策 (The Chinese Communist Party’s religious policy),
天安门广场示威 (Tienanmen Square demonstrations),
1989年民主运动 (1989 democracy movement), and采
取暴力镇压 (To take a violent crackdown). Interestingly,
we also see that discussion of China’s religious policy, the
“New Tang Dynasty”–a religious radio broadcast located
in the United States–, and European Union legislation
may also be considered sensitive content. [31]. Together,
these results suggest that references to collective political
dissent are highly likely to be censored. This is consistent
with the findings of King et al. [17].
6 Conclusion
We built a block list of 1125 censored websites in China
that are not present on the largest block list [8]. Fur-
thermore, our list is 12.5× larger than the most widely
used block list [6]. It contains human rights organiza-
tions, minority news outlets, religious blogs, political
dissent groups, privacy-enhancing technology providers,
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Chinese English Censored domains
中共威胁 Chinese Communists threaten 50%
声明的反共产主义 Declared anti-communist 44%
中国共产党的公共安全 Public security of the CPC 42%
北京清洁 Beijing clean-up 40%
江泽民胡锦涛 Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao 40%
迫害活动 Persecution activities 40%
官员呼吁 Officials called on 36%
重的公民 Heavy Citizen 36%
非法拘留 Illegal detention 36%
不同的民主 Different Democratic 34%
Table 3: Sample of bigrams with significant block rates
Chinese English Censored domains
北戴河会议 BEIDAIHE meeting 54%
中国共产党的宗教政策 The Chinese Communist Party’s religious policy 42%
采取暴力镇压 To take a violent crackdown 38%
香港政 治 Hong Kong Politics 34%
欧洲议会决议 European Parliament Resolution 32%
新唐王朝 New Tang Dynasty 32%
恐怖事件。 A terrorist event. 32%
天安门广场示威 Tienanmen Square Demonstrations 32%
敦促美国政府 Urging the US government 32%
1989民主运动 1989 democracy movement 30%
Table 4: Sample of trigrams with significant blockrates
and more. We’ve made our source code and block list
available on GitHub [15].
Automatically detecting which websites are censored
in a given country is an open problem. One way of im-
proving our work would be to experiment with advanced
natural-language processing techniques to identify better
search terms. For example, we could try using Stanford
CoreNLP’s part-of-speech tagger to identify phrases that
describe some action against the Chinese government.
This approach might identify the following phrase: “Chi-
nese citizens protest against the Communist Party on June
4th”. We believe that using such culture-specific phrases
as search terms would enable us to discover even more
websites that are censored in China.
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